Analysis of scal policy changes using general equilibrium models with forwardlooking agents typically requires the modeler to assume a counterfactual adjustment to some scal instrument in order to achieve the debt sustainability implied by the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Since the scal instrument chosen to close the model can induce economic behavior unrelated to the policy change in models where Ricardian Equivalence does not hold, noise may be introduced into the analysis. In this paper we use such an overlapping generations framework to examine the impact of alternative scal closing assumptions on projected changes to economic aggregates over the ten-year`budget window' following a change in tax policy, assessing the extent to which the noise associated with a particular scal instrument can be mitigated. We nd that while quantitative dierences in projected macroeconomic activity can be observed across alternative scal instruments, these dierences tend to shrink as the date that scal instruments begin to adjust is delayed into the future. Since the particular scal instrument chosen to achieve debt sustainability can then become relatively unimportant, the reliability of policy analysis obtained using this class of models may be improved.
Introduction
General-equilibrium models with forward-looking, rational agents have become a workhorse for analyzing the macroeconomic eects of federal scal policy proposals over thè budget window' both within government and private research institutions. 1 Obtaining a solution to these models, however, typically requires the modeler to assume adjustments to scal policy counterfactual to the proposal in order to keep public debt on the sustainable path implied by the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Auerbach (2005) , Gale and Samwick (2014) , Elmendorf (2015) , and Auerbach et al. (2017) emphasize that these scal closing assumptions may induce economic behavior unrelated to the policy proposal, as the models typically used for policy analysis do not exhibit the Ricardian Equivalence property. While Diamond and Moomau (2003) , Altshuler et al. (2005) , CBO (2005) , JCT (2006a) , and JCT (2006b) provide evidence that budget-window projections of macroeconomic activity following a tax policy change are sensitive to alternative scal instruments used for the closing assumption, there is little evidence that exists to show how well the the within-budget-window noise associated with a particular scal instrument can be mitigated.
The purpose of this paper is both to provide a quantitative assessment of the withinbudget-window eects associated with alternative scal instruments used in practice, and to explore the extent to which the associated noise can be mitigated. We examine the eects associated with choosing lump-sum transfer payments as the scal instrument for adjustment as in Zodrow and Diamond (2013) , non-valued government consumption as in DeBacker et al. (2018) and Page and Smetters (2016) , or a combination of both as in Moore and Pecoraro (2018) . We do so using the overlapping generations model of Moore and Pecoraro (2018) (MP-OLG), a framework which shares core properties common to other models used for policy analysis, including the absence of Ricardian Equivalence.
In our analysis, we repeatedly simulate a tax policy change, each time varying only the scal instrument and implementation timing of the closing assumption. We nd that while quantitative dierences in key macroeconomic aggregates and prices projected over the budget window can be observed across alternative scal instruments, these dierences tend to shrink as the closing date is delayed. The choice of a scal instrument to be used for adjustment therefore becomes less important for the analysis, given that debt is on a sustainable path, because forward-looking agents discount the future when making current decisions. To the extent that the counterfactual eects associated with the particular scal instruments used in the closing assumption are mitigated in practice, the reliability of policy analysis obtained using this class of models may be improved. In the class of dynamic general equilibrium models with rational, forward-looking agents, the government typically faces a recursive budget constraint of the form:
where T R t denotes net transfers to households, G t is government consumption expenditures, T t is tax revenue, and B t is the stock of public debt which is serviced at rate of interest ρ t . Equation (2.1) determines the path of debt for a given sequence of
. Since forward-looking agents condition on this information when making current decisions, public debt must be on`sustainable' path such that the sequence of revenues and outlays allow for the debt to be serviced over an innite horizon.
Budgetary implications associated with a sustainable debt path can be shown by performing recursive substitutions of equation (2.1) and allowing time to approach innity:
Ruling out explosive debt paths requires:
(2.2) so that debt cannot indenitely grow at rate larger than its rate of interest along any sustainable debt path. Satisfaction of the no-Ponzi condition (2.2) implies the following intertemporal government budget constraint:
Although the government's budget can be in total decit or surplus in any given period post-reform, equation (2.3) implies that the present discounted value of tax receipts net of the debt position at time t must be sucient to nance the present discounted value of outlays in any feasible equilibrium.
2.2
The Fiscal Closing Assumption A non-revenue-neutral tax policy change will alter the present discounted value of receipts on the right-hand side of equation (2.3). If the policy-induced change to cumulative decits implies that debt will indenitely grow at a rate larger than its rate of interest and therefore violate equation (2.2), there must be a compensating adjustment to some scal instrument so that equation (2.3) holds. While this adjustment may in principle occur through any scal instrument available to the government, it is common in practice for the modeler to choose either lump-sum transfers, non-valued government consumption expenditures, or some combination of the two. This involves the re-specication of
post-reform in some fashion not specied in the actual policy proposal under analysis.
A change to either scal instrument for purposes of achieving debt sustainability will be internalized by all agents either directly through their individual budget constraint, or indirectly through general equilibrium, and thereby introduce counterfactual behavior into the analysis: A change in transfer payments will alter the present discounted value of lifetime net income expected by those households receiving them in the initial equilibrium. This may introduce a non-negligible income eect to these households, who would respond by altering their savings or labor supply plans. A change in government expenditures, on the other hand, will alter the quantity of nal goods purchased. This may induce a 3 non-negligible change in the rate of capital accumulation, as rms would desire to use a dierent quantity of capital in combination with labor when production levels change in response to the change in government expenditures. Thus, the projected macroeconomic activity over the budget window will therefore depend not only on the tax policy being modeled, but also on the counterfactual scal closing assumption chosen. The MP-OLG model is a large-scale overlapping generations model developed specically for the macroeconomic analysis of tax policy proposals. It shares characteristics common to general equilibrium models of this class: Finitely-lived corhots households make labor supply, saving, and consumption choices, discounting utility generated by future choices relative to current choices. Firms demand labor and business capital each period for production and sale of an output good that can be transformed by households into a consumable good or a nancial asset. Taxes are collected on income by a government and, along with public bond issues, are used to nance expenditures and transfer payments.
Using the MP-OLG model, we repeat a tax policy change performed in Moore and Pecoraro (2018) : We simulate a permanent ten-percent reduction in the United States federal statutory tax rates applied to ordinary income which includes wage income, interest income, short-term capital gains, nonqualied dividends, and pass-through business income relative to 2018 present tax law, assuming that any expiring tax provisions in our baseline are permanent. The conventional revenue eect amounts to slightly less than 0.8% per year over 2019-2028. 3 The policy change is unanticipated by agents, after which time all agents are assumed to have perfect foresight regarding both future scal policy and economic conditions. We repeatedly simulate this reform, varying only the scal instrument and implementation timing of the closing assumption imposed: Adjustments using 100% lump-sum transfer payments and 100% non-valued government consumption expenditures are made in turn contemporaneously with reform in year 1, as well as in post-reform years 11, 21, and 31. In each case, we allow adjustment to occur in a linearly decreasing fashion over ten years following the specied closing date.
3.2
Results and Discussion Tables 1 and 2 show the responses of key macroeconomic variables due to the tax policy change where lump-sum transfer payments and non-valued government consumption expenditures are used in turn as the scal instrument for adjustment. These responses are expressed as average annual percent changes relative to the present-law baseline over the ten-year budget window. For ease of comparison, we highlight cases where these absolute dierences are greater than 0.1 percentage points. We note two important patterns: First, the response of aggregates are qualitatively consistent across all eight scal closing assumptions. In each case, the policy change is shown to increase economic activity in labor, capital, and product markets while generating a large revenue loss. Second, there are large quantitative dierences in the response of aggregates across scal instruments when the scal closing assumption is imposed shortly after the policy change, such as in years 1 and 11.
The substantial quantitative dierences across scal instruments described above arise because each particular scal instrument introduces counterfactual behavior into the analysis. Consider the results in Table 1 where transfer payments to households decrease to stabilize the path of debt: Eective labor supply is relatively high due to an income eect as there is an expected reduction in households' present discounted value of lifetime net income. Since this raises the marginal product of capital, more business capital investment occurs. As a result, aggregate output increases by relatively more when scal closing is imposed in earlier years than in later years. Similarly, consider the results in Table 2 where government consumption expenditures decrease to achieve scal sustainability: The increase in business capital is relatively smaller, which reects the reduction in expected production in response to less government purchases of nal goods.
Our main nding, evident from a comparison of Tables 1 and 2, is that the dierent eects associated with each scal instrument tend to weaken within the ten-year budget window the further that the scal closing date is pushed into the future. This result occurs because households who discount future utility give less weight to the eects of future scal policy when making current decisions, and zero weight to eects occurring after their lifetime. As the scal closing date is delayed, provided debt remains on a sustainable path, the eects idiosyncratic to each particular scal instrument are quantitatively mitigated over the budget window.
There are limitations to the length of time that the scal closing date can be delayed, thereby mitigating the noise associated with the closing assumption, as there must be sucient resources available to return debt to a sustainable path. For example, using the MP-OLG model, we cannot simulate the policy analyzed here while imposing scal closing in year 41 with either scal instrument. As the model is calibrated to target the relative size of present-law U.S. federal tax revenues, net transfer payments, public investment, as well as public debt and debt servicing costs in the initial baseline, there is not a sucient level of transfers or government consumption expenditures available to return public debt to a sustainable path following four decades of debt nancing for this particularly large policy change. For this reason, the extent to which scal closing can be delayed is both model-and policy-specic.
Finally, as an alternative to using 100% transfer payments or government consumption as the scal instrument for adjustment, we also report results using both scal instruments simultaneously in Table 3 where each instrument nances half of the necessary adjustment. Cases where the absolute dierence from the corresponding average of the two previous alternatives is greater than 0.1 percentage points are highlighted in gray. Our results show that, when imposed at a given time after the budget window, this hybrid scal closing assumption generates aggregate responses that are good approximations of a simple average of the alternative two assumptions. Since the scal instrument to be used in the future to maintain debt sustainability is often unknown a priori when policy changes are analyzed, this relationship provides support for use of the hybrid scal closing assumption as a reasonable alternative in practice. 4 Conclusion This paper has examined the eects of dierent scal closing assumptions on budgetwindow projections of macroeconomic activity following a change in tax policy, assessing the eects to which the noise associated with the particular scal instrument chosen for adjustment to maintain a sustainable debt path can be mitigated. Focusing on two scal instruments commonly-used to balance the government's budget in the long run, lump-sum transfer payments and government consumption expenditures, we have found that quantitative dierences in projected aggregates across instruments tend to shrink as the scal closing date is delayed. This result implies that the choice of scal instrument used to achieve the debt sustainability implied by the government's intertemporal budget constraint becomes less important for the quantitative analysis as the closing date is pushed further into the future.
The mechanism which underlies our ndings depends on the behavior of forwardlooking, rational agents who discount future utility. Since agents with these characteristics are typically present in other macroeconomic models used for policy analysis that require a scal closing assumption, we expect these ndings to generalize. To the extent that the counterfactual eects associated with the choice of a particular scal instrument used to close the model are mitigated, the reliability of budget-window analyses produced by this class of models may be improved. 
